Jean Joseph Mounier, The Tennis Court (1790)
Ah, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)—our favorite playground of legal drama. In the latest episode of “Let’s Talk About Mental Disabilities and Voting Rights,” the Court once again tries to wrestle with modern-day standards and, quite frankly, drops the ball (again). Today, we’re diving into Caamaño Valle v. Spain, where the Court just couldn’t quite get it together when it came to voting rights for people with mental disabilities.
The Drama Unfolds
Our protagonist, M., a young woman with a mental disability, found herself barred from voting in Spain. Her mother, the applicant in this case, requested a court to extend her legal guardianship as M. turned 18. Simple enough, right? But here’s where it gets spicy: M.’s mother specifically asked the court not to take away her daughter’s right to vote. The court, of course, ignored that and went right ahead with disenfranchising M., arguing she was too “influenceable” and unaware of the consequences of her vote (§12).
The case escalated all the way to the ECtHR, and you’d think we were in for a progressive outcome, right? Wrong.
ECtHR: Playing by Old Rules
Instead of embracing the evolving landscape of disability rights, the ECtHR decided to dust off an old, eleven-year precedent from Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (§56). Their line of reasoning? It’s perfectly fine to disenfranchise someone if you make an individual assessment of their mental capacity. So, because Spain didn’t automatically bar M. from voting (it kindly judged her capacity first), the Court ruled that her disenfranchisement didn’t breach her human rights. No violation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (the right to free elections) or Article 14 (discrimination) (§68).
The Court was quick to point out that there’s “no consensus” among member states on whether people with mental disabilities should have an unconditional right to vote (§59). Huh, consensus, you say? We’ll get back to that.
Cue the Plot Twist: Enter the CRPD
Now, if you’ve been keeping up with international human rights, you’ll know that the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) isn’t exactly a new kid on the block. The CRPD clearly says that persons with disabilities, including those with mental disabilities, should have full voting rights—no exceptions (§24). But here’s where the ECtHR decided to spice things up: they flat out rejected the CRPD principles (§54). Yes, you read that right. The Court chose to stick with its old habits rather than align itself with the CRPD, a treaty that’s been ratified by 45 out of 47 Council of Europe member states. That’s almost everyone, folks.
Judge Lemmens: The Hero We Deserve
Enter Judge Lemmens with a dissent that’s more refreshing than your morning coffee. He took one look at the majority opinion and went, “Hold my gavel.” While the other judges leaned on their solid (but dated) reasoning, Judge Lemmens argued that it’s high time the Court updates its approach (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lemmens, §1). Spoiler alert: he believes that the CRPD should be our guiding light here. According to Lemmens, denying M. the right to vote because of her mental disability is discriminatory, plain and simple (§5).
He threw in a zinger too, reminding everyone that excluding people with disabilities from voting isn’t just bad for them—it’s bad for democracy (§13). After all, if a whole group of people is disenfranchised, can we really call it the “free expression of the opinion of the people”?
Spain Changes its Mind… Too Late
Here’s the kicker: in 2018, Spain actually amended its laws to grant full voting rights to people with disabilities, in line with the CRPD (§19). Hooray, right? Well, not quite. The ECtHR still maintained that the old system—under which M. was disenfranchised—was totally fine at the time. So, no harm, no foul? Except, you know, the small issue of M. losing her right to vote before Spain had its epiphany (§68).
Consensus or Confusion?
Let’s talk about this so-called “lack of consensus” the ECtHR keeps harping on. The Court seemed very comfortable pointing out that most states aren’t quite ready to give unconditional voting rights to people with mental disabilities (§59). But wait—if 45 of 47 states have ratified the CRPD, doesn’t that say something? Judge Lemmens certainly thought so, and he’s got a point (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lemmens, §8). When almost every country agrees in principle, what’s stopping the Court from following suit? (Hint: nothing, really.)
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
The bottom line here? The ECtHR continues to be stuck in this awkward limbo when it comes to disability rights. Sometimes, they’re on the cutting edge (see G.L. v. Italy), and other times, they’re playing it frustratingly safe, like in Caamaño Valle. It’s the legal equivalent of doing the cha-cha: one step forward, two steps back.
What’s even more perplexing is the missed opportunity for the ECtHR to align itself with the CRPD and solidify the future of disability rights in Europe. Instead, we got a decision that feels outdated and out of touch with international human rights standards.
Final Thoughts: ECtHR, It’s Time for an Upgrade
In a world where the CRPD sets the gold standard for disability rights, it’s high time the ECtHR stops hiding behind old precedents and “lack of consensus” arguments. If Judge Lemmens’ dissent is any indication, there’s hope for a shift in the future. But for now, the Court’s reluctance to embrace progressive change feels like a missed opportunity—one that leaves us with more questions than answers about the future of voting rights for people with disabilities.
So there you have it: Caamaño Valle v. Spain—a case that reminds us that sometimes, the legal world isn’t as forward-thinking as we’d like. Let’s hope next time the ECtHR decides to dance, they pick a better partner than outdated case law.
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